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I
THE LAWYER'S DUTY TO REPORT
ANOTHER LAWYER'S UNETHICAL
VIOLATIONS IN THE WAKE
OF HIMMEL
Ronald D. Rotunda •
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ethics of lawyers have been very much in the news in recent
years, as several major law firms have settled, for substantial sums, various malpractice claims based on ethical violations. New York City's
Rogers & Wells, for example, settled, for $40 million, a case in which it
continued to represent a client after it should have known that the client
was perpetrating a fraud. 1 Chicago's Winston & Strawn settled, for approximately $7.3 million, a lawsuit involving allegedly reckless advice it
had given on securities law 2 Baltimore's Venable, Baetjer & Howard
had to pay $27 million when it settled a lawsuit involving conflicts of
interest 3 These are hardly nuisance settlements.
The lawyers for Ivan Boesky-the prestigious law firm of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (Fried, Frank)-now find themselves
as codefendants in an investors lawsuit brought against Boesky. Fried,
Frank had prepared the private placement memorandum and had written legal opinions for Boesky. Judge Milton Pollack rejected defendants'
motions to dismiss the complaint based on their arguments involving,
inter alia, the substantiality of the alleged participation, the loss causation of the transactions pleaded, and the losses claimed to have occurred! Sullivan & Cromwell has been challenged for the fifth time in
recent years on the grounds that its conduct in a case may have been
unethical; the trial judge, in a precedent-setting decision, approved a tern* Professor of Law, University of illinois. A.B. 1967, Harvard University; J.D. 1970, Harvard
Law School. The author thanks Professors 0. Fred Harris and Thomas D. Morgan for reading the
manuscript and offering suggestions. They, of course, are not responsible for any errors that may
remain.
The author is further indebted to the research support provided through the generosity ofli Ross
and Helen Workman, who have funded the Workman Research Grants of the University of Illinois
College of Law.
1. See After A $40M Payment, It's Not Over Yerfor Rogers & Wells, Nat'! L.J., Apr. 14, 1986,
at 1, col. 1.
2. See Winston & Strawn to Pay $7.3M in Pact, Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
3. See Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, Nat'! L.J., May 25, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
4. Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 87 Civ. 1865 (MP) (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1987).
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porary restraining order barring a tender offer because of alleged conflicts of interest involving Sullivan & Cromwell. 5
Yet malpractice suits and motions for disqualification are not the
only way-nor are they supposed to be the primary way-to enforce the
minimum ethics of the legal profession. In modern times, state courts
have established attorney discipline systems to enforce the rules governing the minimum standards for lawyers. 6 Thus, the Illinois Supreme
Court has established the Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission, often called, after its initial letters, the ARDC. The Illinois
Supreme Court has also adopted rules governing lawyers 7 Although the
legislature has not enacted these rules, they are still law in the same way,
for example, that court-promulgated rules of civil procedure are law.
Until almost the beginning of this century there were no codes of
ethics for lawyers. 8 Various nineteenth-century commentators discussed
attitudes among lawyers regarding ethics, and some even published their
own proposals recommending how lawyers should behave. 9 But there
was no official, written, regulatory code. In fact, throughout the entire
last century' it was very unusual that a lawyer would ever be disciplined. 10 If lawyers engaged in particularly outrageous conduct before
the court, a local judge might impose some sort of discipline, even disbarment, but the judge based such discipline not on any promulgated code
but on what the courts referred to as the inherent power of the judiciary
to regulate the lawyers practicing before it. 11 Lawyers, proclaimed the
5. Cohen, Sullivan & Cromwell Faces Challenge Over Role in Electrolux Bid for Murray, Wall
St. J., May 16, 1988, at 8, cols. l-2 (midwest ed.). Jonathan Lerner, a partner with Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flam commented: "I'm aware of no other situation in which an alleged conflict by
a lawyer has been the basis for an injunction against a tender offer." ld. at 8, col. l.
Subsequently, Skadden, Arps found itself in the middle of an ethics charge involving its tactics
on behalf of Coastal Corp. in its takeover battle against Texas Eastern Corp. "The legal tangle,
which has raised eyebrows and reddened faces in the closely knit world of takeover attorneys, involves secret court filings that opposing counsel didn't know about [and] admittedly false stat'ements
made by attorneys in court .... " Cohen, Texas Eastem-Coastal Battle Spurs QueStions on Conduct
of Skadden, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1989, at B7, cols. 1-2 (midwest ed.).
6. ~From 1978 to 1982, there has beeil a 73% increase in sanctions. McPike & Harrison, The
True Story on Lawyer Discipline, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 92.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, art. VIII (1987).
8. Alabama, influenced by the works of Judge Sharswood and David Hoffman, see infra note
9, was the first state to publish a Code of Legal Ethics. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420 (1978).
9. See D. HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (1836); G. SHARSWOOD, AN EsSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1860).
10. See, e.g., R. PoUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 184-85, 242-48
(1953).
11. E.g,, Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 53! (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (a court's disciplinary power is "incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the
respectability of the profession"); cf Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694 (N.C. 1987)
(state supreme court upholds plan requiring each lawyer to pay $50 each into a client security fund;
this opinion extensively discusses the "inherent power" of courts over attorneys).
. Needless to say, some of the early discipline actions do not comport with modern notions of due
process. Gressman, Inherent Judicial Power and Disciplinary Due Process, 18 SETON HALL L REv.
541, 542-46 (1988); cf Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883); id. at 290-318 (Field, J., dissenting).
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judges, are "officers of the court." 12
Not until 1908, at the thirty-first annual meeting of the American
Bar Association, did that organization adopt anything resembling a code
of ethics. The document was entitled the "Canons of Professional Ethics," and its preamble emphasized that it was not really a code of law but
only "a general guide," 13 not at all intended to be definitive. The Canons' "numeration of particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the existence of other equally imperative, though not specifically
mentioned" duties. 14
It is fair to say that, while there has not been an extensive conspiracy of silence among lawyers, 15 many lawyers in fact are reluctant to sue
their fellow lawyers and, naturally, also disinclined to report them to the
disciplinary authorities. 16 Thus, it is interesting that as early as 1908 the
American Bar Association supported, in somewhat generic terms, a duty
to report. Canon 29 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the first ABA
code, is entitled "Upholding the Honor of the Profession." Canon 29
provided that "lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the
proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and
should accept without hesitation employment against a member of the
Bar who has wronged his c!ient." 17
It is easier for the organized bar to agree that there is such a duty
than to enforce it. Over sixty years after the ABA promulgated its Canons, an ABA special committee, chaired by former United States
Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, concluded that lawyers' and judges'
reluctance to report attorney misconduct was a major problem with attorney discipline. 18 Nonetheless, the ABA, at the turn of the century, set
the stage by endorsing an attorney's obligation to report professional
miscond net.
The general public and the average lawyer probably did not really
expect this primitive code of ethics to be the basis for statutory rules
12. Gaethe, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989).
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Preamble (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. RoTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 412 (1989).

14. Id.
15. An attorney's belief in a "code of silence" that would prevent him Jrom answering questions regarding his knowledge of another attorney's misconduct is evidence that he is not "fit to
practice law." In re Anglin, 122 IlL 2d 531, 539, 524 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1988).
16. Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Professional: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 100-0l (1974); Marks & Cathcart, Di"sCip!in"e Within the Legal Profession: Is It
Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. LF. 193, 207; Hill, The Bar at Bay: Malpractice Woes Hit Attorneys
as Lawsuits Against Them Increase, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1976, at I, 26, cols. 1-2 (eastern ed.).
17. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. RoTUNDA, supra note 13, at 420; see also id. at Canon 28 ("A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the Bar having-knowledge of (improper solicitation] to immediately
inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred.").
18. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DlSCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 167 (1970); see alfo supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
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imposing legal discipline on lawyers. 19 Most of the sections are written
in rather quaint and vague terms, 20 homilies of an earlier era. 21 Such
nebulous language is not like statutory language at all. 22 Nonetheless,
after the Canons were published, the courts, when confronted with a lawyer's conduct that they viewed as improper, would often cite these ABA
Canons (or local bar association canons, derived from the ABA Canons)
as evidence of lawyers' ethical obligations. 23 Although the ABA Canons
had not been enacted into law by court rule or legislative action, judges
perhaps believed that it would be prudent to refer to some authority for
their actions other than merely the court's inherent power. Often that
other authority was the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics.
On August 12, 1969, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted an entirely new code, then called the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. It was written in much more statutory terms,
with black letter requirements called "Disciplinary Rules" (DRs). This
code made very clear that its Disciplinary Rules set a minimum standard
below which a lawyer could not fa!J.2 4 Strong evidence that the American Bar Association clearly intended its new code was to be not merely
self-edifying but binding was its accompanying statement: the Code was
"adopted" on August 12, 1969 by the ABA House of Delegates "to become effective for American Bar Association members on January I,
1970." 25 Years later, in an atmosphere where the Department of Justice
had brought antitrust charges against the ABA, 26 the ABA changed the
title of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 27 No longer did the ABA speak of this Model
19. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986).
20. The Canons were based on the model of a $Olo practitioner usually engaging in litigation,
that is, in litigation that is straightforward, not complex multiparty litigation. Its successor, the
MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970), shares this same mind-set. See G. HAZARD, Ennes IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7, 16-18 (1978).
21. Stone, The Public Influence ofrhe Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. I, 10 (1934).
22. E.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 2 (1908) ("The aspiration of lawyers for
judicial position should be governed by an impartial estimate of their ability to add honor to the
office and not by a desire for the distinction the position may bring to themselves.").
23. E.g., Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957)
(citing ABA's CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1937)), cert. denied, 355 U.S.

966 (!958).
24. E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBlLJTY DR l-J02(A)(l) (1980); see '0/So
id. Preliminary Statement ("The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.").
25. This statement is reprinted in V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FlNMAN, & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 889 n.* (2d ed. 1976).
26. See Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suir Again:~t the ABA, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538 (1978)
where the Justice Department memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss its antitrust suit
against the ABA without prejudice because of change in circumstances and the increase in competi·
tion is reprinted. The Government filed its suit on June 25, 1976, and dismissed it on August 30,
1978.
27. See ABA Corum. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420 (1978).
The title of this informal opinion is: "Purpose and Intended Effect of the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Opinions of the Ethics Committee." The ABA ethics
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Code as binding on its members.
This new ABA code set out not only discipline standards, below
which a lawyer may not go, but also aspirational standards expressed in
what were called "Ethical Considerations." The very first version of the
ABA Model Code-it was amended periodically until 1981 and, in 1983,
replaced by the new ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct2 8-provided a whistle-blowing role for lawyers similar to that found in the earlier Canons of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the Model Code
made clear that this duty to report is not merely an aspirational one but
one of discipline. Disciplinary Rule I-103(A) provides, "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority in power to investigate
or act upon such violation."
The cross reference to "DR 1-102'' indicates the breadth of thereporting obligation. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 is entitled "Misconduct"
and it provides a lawyer shall not "[v]iolate a disciplinary rule," or "circumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another," or engage in
"illegal conduct involving moral turpitude," or any conduct "involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 29 In addition, Disciplinary Rule 1-102 has two other broad-brushed prohibitions: a lawyer
shall not engage in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice"30 or "any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. " 31
Illinois, like almost all other states, has followed the lead of the
ABA Model Code and imposed a whistle-blowing rule for its lawyers.
However, the Illinois cross-references are more specific and more carefully drafted than ABA Disciplinary Rule 1-103 from which the Illinois
rule is derived. Illinois Rule 1-!03(a) provides that a lawyer "possessing
unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule l-102(a)(3) or (4) shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority in power to invescommittee published this informal opinion on June 5, 1978, shortly before the Department of Justice
dismissed its antitrust case against the ABA. See Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suit Against
the ABA, supra note 26.
The Informal Opinion took pains to emphasize:
Other than serving as a model or derivative source, the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility plays .no part in the disciplinary proceeding, except as a guide for
consideration in the adoption of local applicable rules for the regulation of conduct on the part
of legal practitioners ..
At one time the American Bar Association membership application form contained a statement to the effect that the member would abide by the American Bar Association canons of
ethics and later by the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility.
(T]his statement on the application form ceased to have any meaning long before it was belatedly removed by the Board of Governors in 1976.
28. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983. Because they were "model" rules, they had no effective date. About half of the states
have adopted the new Model Rules. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-4 (Dec. 21,
1988).
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBJLJTY DR 1-102(A)(l)·(4) (1980).
30. Id. DR 1-102 (A)(5).
· 31. Jd. DR 1-102(A)(6).
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tigate or act upon such violation." 32 Subsection (a)(3) of Illinois Rule 1102, in turn, states that a lawyer should not engage in illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude, and subsection (a)(4) says that the lawyer
should not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
The Illinois rule regarding whistle blowing is not unusual. What is
unusual is its enforcement. While there are lawyers who take seriously
their ethical obligations to report the violations of other lawyers, it is
unusual to find the bar authorities enforcing this rule. If we look through
all of the courts of this land, it is virtually unheard of to find a case where
a lawyer is disciplined merely for refusing to report another lawyer. 33
We can find cases where lawyers are disciplined under the state rule corresponding to ABA Disciplinary Rule l-103(A), but a close reading of
these cases shows that the lawyer also did something else wrong. In
those cases where the lawyer was disciplined for failing to report another
lawyer, the failure to report was merely one of several discipline violations, with the bar authorities or the court throwing in the failure to
report as one violation among many. 34
That is, until Himmel. 35
H.

THE HIMMEL CASE

The Himmel case is very significant. H is the first case in which a
lawyer is charged with nothing except failing to report another lawyer's
misconduct, under circumstances in which the client specifically told her
lawyer not to report the other lawyer's misconduct. Attorneys have
greeted Himmel with surprise. 36 The Illinois Supreme Court did not
treat Mr. Himmel's violation lightly; it disciplined this solo practitioner
by suspending him for one year.
Let us hriefiy look at the facts of Himmel. The beginnings of the
case stretch back more than a decade. In October 1978, after one
Tammy Forsberg had been injured in a motorcycle accident, she retained
an attorney named John R. Casey to represent her. Casey worked out a
settlement of $35,000, one-third to go to him and two-thirds to Ms. Forsberg. However, when Casey received the $35,000 settlement check, he
converted the funds.
After several unsuccessful attempts to collect her share of over
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, Rule l-l03(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
33. R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESI'ONSJBJLITY 31 (2d ed. 1988).
34. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d 1336 (1981) (attorney disbarred for failing to report and aiding unethical conduct of his law firm); Matter of Bonafield, 75
N.J. 490, 383 A.2d 1143 (1978) (attorney disciplined for failing to report another and for aiding
another attorney's unethical conduct).
35. In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
36. Harlan, Illinois Decision Muddles Attorney-Client Privilege, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1989, at Bl,
cols. 5-6 (midwest ed.); Middleton, Illinois Bar Is Jarred by "Snitch" Case, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988,
at 3, 23.
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$23,000, Ms. Forsberg hired James H. Himmel to represent her. He offered not to collect any fees until she had recovered her full $23,233.34;
he would then collect only one-third of any funds recovered in excess of
that amount. After Himmel entered the case, Casey agreed to pay Forsberg $75,000 in settlement of all claims she might have against him including, presumably, any claims· for punitive damages. 37 Under the
settlement agreement, Ms. Forsberg agreed not to initiate any criminal,
civil, or disciplinary action against Casey. 38 Casey, it seems, did not
honor this agreement, and so Himmel, on behalf of his client, sued Casey
and won a judgment of $100,000. Himmel was never able to collect all of
this award, but because of Himmel's efforts, Ms. Forsberg eventually collected a total of $15,400 from Casey. Himmel therefore received no fee
for his efforts because, pursuant to his agreement with Ms. Forsberg, the
amount was less than the full amount owed her.
Neither before nor after the $100,000 judgment against Casey did
Himmel report Casey to the disciplinary authorities, because Forsberg
had specifically instructed him not to take any other action. She said she
simply wanted her money back. She may have wanted to do nothing that
might be construed as desiring revenge. Also, Ms. Forsberg may have
been concerned that by having her attorney report Casey she wonld raise
the stakes in their dispute and make it that much more difficult to collect
any money from Casey. 39
On January 22, 1986, a few months after Ms. Forsberg's judgment
against Casey, the ARDC began formal disciplinary proceedings against
Himmel, for failing to report Casey.
Apparently Ms. Forsberg, prior to retaining Himmel, had contacted
the ARDC. Whether she actually reported Casey to the ARDC was a
matter of some dispute. The Review Board (the intermediate appellate
authority for the ARDC), over the objections of the ARDC, specifically
found that Ms. Forsberg had complained to the ARDC about Casey
prior to hiring Himmel. Presumably, she had turned to the lawyers in
the ARDC in her efforts to secure their aid in recovering from Casey the
money that he had converted from her. Following that attempt, she retained Himmel. The Review Board specifically found that Ms. Forsberg
had contacted the ARDC prior to hiring Himmel and that therefore the
37. This agreement occurred in April 1983. 125 Ill. 2d at 535-36, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
38. Perhaps a portion of the $75,000 settlement represented "hush money," i.e., an amount
paid in consideration of not initiating any criminal or discipline action against Casey. See infra note
44. Himmel, however, probably thought of the extra amount as akin to treble damages. Telephone
conversation with ARDC spokesperson (Mar. 31, 1989). Ms. Forsberg was on a motorcycle that
was struck by a Corvette that went through a stop sign. Ms. Forsberg suffered a concussion, was in
the hospital for about a month, was in a cast for many more months, and had $20,000 to $25,000 in
medical bills alone. Transcript of Disciplinary Proceeding at 12-17, In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531,
533 N.E.2d 790 (1988) (No. 86, ch. 24). This evidence suggests that Casey probably settled Ms.
Forsberg's personal injury claim too cheaply.
39. Cf Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 449, 521 P.2d 858, 866 ("It is not unreasonable
for a disgruntled client to attempt to resolve his differences with an attorney through a civil action
before filing a Complaint with the State Bar."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
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ARDC "did have knowledge of the alleged misconduct [by Casey]." 40
The ARDC disputed the finding of the Review Board that it had
actually learned about Casey from Ms. Forsberg's initial complaint. The
Illinois Supreme Court did not disturb this finding and assumed it to be
correct. In fact, the court found this factual issue irrelevant to its holding. "The question is," the court said, "whether or not respondent violated the Code, not whether Forsberg informed the [Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary] Commission of Casey's misconduct." 41
The ARDC apparently learned of Casey because of various other
complaints against him brought by additional clients also harmed by
Casey's violations of his ethical obligations. During April 1985, the
ARDC administrator petitioned to have Casey suspended because of his
"conversion of client funds and his conduct involving moral turpitude in
matters unrelated to Forsberg's claim." 42 On November 5, 1985, Casey
was disbarred on consent." On January 22, 1986, the ARDC turned its
attention to Mr. Himmel and filed a complaint before the Hearing Board.
The Hearing Board concluded that Himmel had received "unprivileged information" about Casey's violations and therefore should
have reported his actions to the disciplinary authorities. However, because Himmel had practiced law for eleven years, had no prior record of
any complaints, and did not even receive a fee for recovering what money
he could for Ms. Forsberg, the' Hearing Board (the initial disciplinary
authority of the ARDC) said that it recommended only a private
reprimand.
The administrator of the ARDC appealed that decision to the Review Board. On this level the ARDC was even less successful, for the
Review Board recommended that the complaint be dismissed. First, the
Review Board concluded that the disciplinary authorities already had
knowledge of Casey's problem, from Ms. Forsberg herself. Second, it
noted that Ms. Forsberg had specifically instructed Himmel not to report
Casey to the disciplinary authorities or to anybody else.
Then, the administrator of the ARDC filed before the Illinois
Supreme Court a petition for leave to file exceptions. He argued, among
other things, that there was misconduct in failing to inform the disciplinary commission of Casey's conversion of Ms. Forsberg's funds and that
this conduct warranted at least a censure under the law. The Illinois
Supreme Court responded by imposing a much more severe sanction: it
suspended Himmel for one year 44
40. 125 IlL 2d at 537, 533 N.E.2d at 792. An independent review of the transcript indicates
that the Review Board finding that Ms. Forsberg had effectively reported Casey to the ARDC is
against the weight of the evidence.
41. Id. at 538, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
42. Jd. at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791 (emphasis added).
4). Id.
44. When the Illinois Supreme Court turned to wha1 it called the "quantum of discipline" to
be imposed on Himmel, the court expressed a great deal of concern that Himmel drafted a settle~
ment agreement between his client and Casey in April1983, and this settlement provided that "For-
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The Quantum of Evidence Needed

On its face, the whistle-blowing rule in canon 1 of the Illinois Code
of Professional Responsibility applies to all disciplinable violations
within its terms, whether they are, in the reporting lawyer's view, flagrant and substantial, or minor and technical. However, an element of
judgment remains because lawyers need not (though they may) report
suspected violations that are not clear violations of the disciplinary rules.
In this case, allegations regarding Casey's conduct, if true, constituted a
clear and serious violation of the relevant disciplinary rules. Indeed, in
this case, the facts regarding Casey's conduct were not in dispute. The
Illinois Supreme Court does not really discuss this issue in any detail, but
the point seems clear enough.
What if the evidence regarding Casey's conduct were more ambiguous? The Illinois Supreme Court does not directly analyze this question,
but its discussion supports the view that the duty to report is a function
of the nature of the offense (for example, conduct involving dishonesty)
and of the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. The fact
that the lawyer who is being reported may deny the charge against him
does not relieve the reporting lawyer of the obligation to blow the whistle. There was eventually a civil judgment against Casey, but Casey apparently did not simply admit guilt and turn over the money when
Himmel presented him with Ms. Forsberg's claim. Recall that even the
Review Board referred to Casey's "alleged misconduct." 45
Typically, the reporting rule does not require that the quantum of
evidence of which the lawyer is aware be beyond dispute. After all, the
sberg agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary action against Casey." Id.
(emphasis added). The court stated at the end of its opinion: "We are particul~rly disturbed by the
fact that respondent chose to draft a settlement agreement with Casey rather than report his misconduct. As the Administrator has stated, by this conduct, both respondent and his client ran afoul of
the Criminal Code's prohibition against compounding a crime.
." Id. at 545, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
The court then quoted from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, TI 32-1 (1987). The 1961 committee comments
to this section state: "There is no intent to prohibit a victim of theft or other property offense taking
steps to recover his property, so long as such action does not involve, as consideration for such
recovery, a promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosecution." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, ,! 32-1
committee comment (Smith-Hurd 1977).
In contrast to the Illinois law, the Model Penal Code § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("Theft by Extortion") provides that one:
is guilty of theft if he obtains property of another by threatening to . . accuse anyone of a
However, it is an
criminal offense; or . . cause an official to take or withhold action .
affirmative defense that the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit or
other invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for
harm done .
Note that Casey breached the April 1983 settlement agreement. Consequently, Mr. Himmel
did not continue to fail to report Casey because of that agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court made
clear that its reliance on the Illinois Criminal Code was only to determine the degree of the sanction
against Himmel, not the decision whether there should be any sanction. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 545,
533 N.E.2d at 796.
Oddly enough, the Illinois court never cited Illinois Rule 7..:105, providing that: "A lawyer shall
not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges to obtain an advantage
in a civil matter."
45. See sUpra text accompanying note 40.
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reporting rule refers to "knowledge" of a violation of a disciplinary rule
It does not require "certainty." The lawyer's knowledge may not go un
challenged. If "knowledge" were interpreted in its existential sens<
rather than its practical sense, the reporting requirement would be l
nullity. 46
On the other hand, there is no mandatory obligation to report men
rumor or suspicion. The ABA Model Code does not specifically define
"knowledge." But, by analogy, the Model Rules define "[k]nowingly,"
"[k)nown," or "[k]nows" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question";
"[r]easonable belief" or "[r]easonably believes" means "that the lawyer
believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that
the belief is reasonable." 47 The Model Rules explain that a "person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." 48
In other words, at some point the lawyer's investigation and study of
the client's charges will convince her that the allegations involving the
other lawyer's misconduct are serious and substantial; that these allegations pertain to illegal conduct involving moral turpitude or conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation within the
meaning of Illinois Rules 1-102 and l-103; and that the evidence of such
conduct is substantial enough that the lawyer has "knowledge." Within
a reasonable time thereafter, the lawyer must report this knowledge if it
is unprivileged. The Illinois Supreme Court did not focus on this interpretation of the rules but rather centered its discussion on the main question before it: did Himmel have "unprivileged" knowledge of a
violation?
B.

The Definition of Unprivileged Information

The most critical issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was
whether Himmel's knowledge of Casey's violation of Illinois Rule 1102(a)(3) or (4) was "unprivileged."
The Illinois Supreme Court explicitly asserts that, in interpreting its
own reporting rule, it finds "instructive" the ethics opinions of the American Bar Association, because the Illinois rules "essentially track the language" of the ABA's Model Code. 49 In the course of its opinion, the
court emphasized this point by citing such an opinion. 50 In this respect
the Illinois Supreme Court has done what many other state and federal
courts have done in the past; there is nothing unusual about referring to
the work product of the ABA Ethics Committee. What is unusual is that
Himmel never referred to how the American Bar Association interprets
46. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in ASsisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?,
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 672 (1981); Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology, paras. [5J, (8] (1983).
48. Jd. at para. [5].

125 Ill. 2d at 540, 533 N.E.2d at 793.
!d. at 540-41, 533 N.E.2d at 793 (citing and discussing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Informal Op. 1210 (1972)).
49.
50.
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the term "privileged information." In particular, the Himmel court
never even cited ABA Formal Opinion 341, interpreting "privileged" to
mean "those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by
DR 4-101." 51 Nor did the court cite the Opinion of the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Association holding that
when DR 1-103 requires a lawyer to report "unprivileged knowledge" of
another lawyer's misconduct, "unprivileged" means information that is
not a confidence or secret under Canon 4. 52
The Illinois court, in determining what "privileged" meant, assumed that "privilege" referred only to the law of evidence. The court
cited and relied on Professor Wigmore's classic definition of when the
privilege is lost-the evidentiary privilege was never a favorite of Wigmore's, and he always interpreted it narrowly-and concluded that there
was no attorney-client privilege in the evidentiary sense.
This conclusion that the evidentiary privilege was lost, given the
facts of Himmel, is within the scope of how that privilege has been interpreted and applied by some courts. The Illinois Supreme Court noted
that at some times Forsberg discussed her problems with Himmel while
Forsberg's mother and her fiancee were present. Because the mother and
fiancee were not agents of Attorney Himmel, under the Wigmore analysis the information ·communicated is not privileged: Ms. Forsberg was
making statements to her lawyer in the presence of third parties not necessary for her communication, and their presence meant that this information was no longer communicated "in confidence." 53 The court also
pointed out that, with Ms. Forsberg's consent, Himmel discussed Casey's
conversion of Forsberg's funds with Casey's insurance company, with the
insurance company's lawyer, and with Casey himself. The court could
have also added that there could be no evidentiary privilege regarding
information communicated in the civil complaint against Casey once that
complaint, through a court filing, had been made public.
Himmel, of course, responded to this argument by explaining that
his client specifically had instructed him not to tell the disciplinary authorities. The court's retort to this argument was rather curt: "A lawyer
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975), reprinted
in T. MORGAN & R. RoTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
239, 240 (4th ed. 1987). See genera//y Rotunda, When the Client Lies: Unhelpful Guides from the
ABA, 1 CORP. L. REV. 34, 39 (1978); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50S. CALL. REV. 809, 837 (1977).
ABA Formal Opinion 341 interprets "privileged" as used in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1980). However, the reasoning of Formal Opinion 341 is not limited
to the term "privileged" as used only in Disciplinary Rule 7-102. Indeed, Formal Opinion 341
Specifically cites the obligation in MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR l-103
(1980) to reveal knowledge of misconduct by a judge or lawyer. Formal Opinion 341 concluded:
"The balancing of the lawyer's duty· to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by
interpreting the phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1·974 amendment to DR 7-l02(B) as referring to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101."
52. ISBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 365 (June 26, 1971), reprinted in 60 ILL. B.J.
153 (1971).
53. 125 Ill. 2d at 541-43, 533 N.E.2d at 794.
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may not choose to circum vent the rules by simply asserting that his client
asked him to do so." 54 The court's argument assumes the point in dispute. Is the client's instruction to the lawyer not to report Casey to the
disciplinary authorities a request that the ru.les of ethics require the lawyer to respect?
For the answer to this question, the court should have discussed its
own canon 4 in the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. 55 This
canon, like canon 1 of the Illinois code, is derived from the ABA Model
Code's Canon 4. Illinois Rule 4-!0l(a) defines the term "confidence"
and the term "secret." "Confidence" is the attorney-client privilege, as
recognized under applicable state law, that is, the law of evidence. The
evidentiary privilege varies from one jurisdiction to another, 56 but the
ethical privilege--the definition of "secret"-is uniform in all states, like
Illinois, that have adopted the ABA's Disciplinary Rule 4-!0l(A). The
Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility both define "secret" as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client." 57
In this case the client specifically directed the lawyer not to report
Casey. The client had requested the lawyer to keep secret this information, whether or not it was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Ms. Forsberg's instruction to her attorney is not surprising. She may·
have concluded that if she or her lawyer made trouble for Casey by reporting him to the ARDC, then Casey might lose his interest in settling
and use up financial resources in defending the ARDC that could have
been used to reimburse Forsberg. If the client instructs the lawyer not to
report something to the ARDC for whatever her reasons-whether she is
embarrassed by the fact that her former lawyer cheated her, whether she
does not want to involve her former lawyer in any more trouble than
necessary to get her money back, or whether she does not want to become involved in extensive, time-consuming, and (given her point of
view) possibly fruitless disciplinary proceedings-Mr. Himmel under canon 4 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility is supposed to
hold her "secret" inviolate. 58
54. Jd. at 539, 533 N.E.2d at 793.
55. ILL REV. STAT. ch. !lOA, canon 4 (1987).
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (19] (1983).
57. ILL REV. STAT. ch. !lOA, Rule 4~l0l(a) (1987); MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) (1980).

58.

ILL REV. STAT. ch. llDA, Rule 4-JOI(d)(2) (1987) provides that an attorney "may" reveal

a confidence or secret "when permitted under disciplinary rules or·required by law or court order."
If that exception were applicable, it would not require the lawyer to reveal, only permit him to
reveal. More significantly, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, Rule l-103(a) (1987) does not "permit" the
lawyer to reveal; by its own tenns it excludes from its coverage "privileged" knowledge. In the
Himmel case, of course, the ARDC could refer to no court order or other law-that is, law other
than Illinois Disciplinary Rule 1·103(A)-that required Himmel to violate his client's instructions.
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Prior to filing the complaint against Casey, Himmel's knowledge
clearly was a "secret" as defined by Illinois Rule 4-!0l(a). After Himmel
filed the civil complaint in February 1985, the question is much less
clear, but it is possible that even then the information contained in that
complaint may not have lost its "secret" status. Once Ms. Forsberg's
case is filed in a court, her complaint against Casey is "public" in the
sense that someone could uncover it and read about it. But even after the
complaint is filed, information about it might still be "secret" in the sense
that the information has not become "generally known.'' 59 Recall that
the ARDC denied that Ms. Forsberg had reported Casey to it. When the
ARDC did proceed against Casey in April 1985, and when Casey was
subsequently disbarred on consent, it was for matters "unrelated to Forsberg's claim." 60 The ARDC apparently did not argue that the Forsberg
complaint and civil action against Casey had become "generally known."
In a busy court system where many cases are filed, Ms. Forsberg's
judicial action is not necessarily public in the sense that it is front page
news (or even that it is news buried on page twenty-four). Her case is
simply one of many cases thrown into an anonymous judicial system.
Whether it is a federal or state case, even if it reaches verdict, it may (like
most cases) never reach an appeal and never be immortalized in a published decision. Even though the information is "public" in the sense
that it is not covered by the attorney-client privilege, it is "secret" in the
sense that knowledge of it is not widely available. The case may remain
obscure and uncelebrated, not "generally known": that is how the
American Bar Association uses the word "secret." It states that the
"ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to
the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge." 61
Himmel is significant not only because it disciplines a lawyer solely
for the failure to report (there were no other disciplinary charges filed
against Mr. Himmel) but primarily because it interprets the word "privileged" in Illinois Rule 1-!03(a) very narrowly and differently than the
way the ABA uses the very same term in the Model Code. 62 Illinois
interprets "privileged" in its ethics code to exclude the ethical privilege.
It is now clear under Illinois law that a lawyer who has knowledge of
another lawyer's disciplinary violations must report those violations unless that knowledge is protected by the very narrow attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Attorneys should now realize that if they fail their
reporting obligation under Himmel they have no protection based on the
claim that they were obeying the "secret" requirement of Illinois Rule 4lOl(a).
59.
60.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule LlO comment (3) (1983).
125 Ill. 2d at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980); see a/so MODEL

61.
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment [5] (1983).

62.

RULES

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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Himmel raises many supplementary questions that future courts
must sort out. The Himmel opinion says that Mr. Himmel had unprivileged knowledge of Casey's conversions of funds. Of course, Casey
also had that knowledge. Must he report himself? The answer is not
entirely clear, but there is evidence that this canon may require a lawyer
to report himself. Some courts suggest that conclusion. 63 In addition,
the very language of the relevant rule, which provides that a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of certain disciplinary rules
must report that conduct, invites that conclusion. The rule does not say
a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of another lawyer's violation
must report. The rule could easily have been drafted to make that point,
but it was not. 64
In future cases we might find that when a lawyer is alleged to have
violated a disciplinary rule, there might be another and extra punishment
meted out if he did not turn himself in. Of course, an attorney who could
plead the fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself could not be
within the reporting requirement of Illinois Rule l-103(a). Not only does
the fifth amendment override a contrary disciplinary rule, but Illinois
Rule 1-103(a), by its own terms, exempts from its application "unprivileged" knowledge. 65 Knowledge protected by the privilege against
self-incrimination would, therefore, not be protected under the reporting
rule. Casey, who stole his clients' funds, would have a fifth amendment
right not to incriminate himself. Ironically, Mr. Himmel is suspended
from the practice of law for refusing to report Casey, though Casey has a
constitutional right not to report himself.
Leaving aside Mr. Casey, what about the insurance company lawyer
and Casey's lawyer, if Mr. Casey had retained separate counsel? Should
not these lawyers-if they were members of the Illinois bar-have an
equal obligation to report? Casey's lawyer is protected by the evidentiary
privilege to the extent that he received confidential information from his
client, Mr. Casey. However, recall that Himmel eventually had to file
suit against Casey. The information that Himmel filed in that complaint
is not privileged under the law of evidence as to Casey. Nor is anything
in the defendant's answer privileged under the law of evidence. Because
the insurance company lawyer represents either Mr. Casey or the insnr63. Cf Tallon v. Committee on Professional Standards, 86 A.D.2d 897, 898, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50,
51 (App. Div. 1982) ("An attorney has a professional duty to promptly notify his client of his failure
to act and of the possible claim his client may thus have against him."). But see 2 R. MALLEN & J.
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE§ 19.5, at 162 (3d ed. 1989) ("Notwithstanding mora] considerations," there is "no civil or ethical standard [that] seems to compel" an attorney to disclose his legal
errors to the client.). Of course, "a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material
developments in the matters being handled for the client." MoDEL CODE Of PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1980); see a/so MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 {1983).
64. Jn contrast, MODEL RTJLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983) is drafted differently. It requires a lawyer to report relevant misconduct of "another lawyer."
65. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1279 (1973); see also
Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Disciplinwy Proceedings: Whatever Happened to Spevak?, 23 VILL L. REV. 127 (1978).

No.4]

LAWYER'S DUTY TO REPORT

991

ance company (but not Himmel's client, Ms. Forsberg), whatever Mr.
Himmel told the insurance company lawyer in negotiations is also not
protected in any way by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The
insurance company lawyer then should also have the obligation to report
the charges involving Casey to the disciplinary authorities. Under Himmel, when insurance company lawyers acquire "knowledge" of a possible
disciplinary violation and this knowledge is not privileged under the law
of evidence, their obligation should be to report it.
And then, of course, there is the judge, who presided at the trial of
Forsberg versus Casey. Because this case was brought before a court, a
judge had to hear the allegations regarding Mr. Casey. The judge is,
most likely, also a member of the Illinois bar and therefore should be
subject to Illinois Rule l-103(a). In such a case, the judge should also
report Mr. Casey. 66 Whether it is a bench trial and whether the jury
issues a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 67 the judge is made aware that he
or she does have knowledge of claims against a lawyer. These claims are
serious indeed, for they involve questions of Casey's honesty and his willingness to convert funds. The court did not discuss these issues regarding a judge's duty to report. But one would think that in the future,
Illinois judges who are members of the Illinois bar should have an obligation to report to the ARDC similar to the obligation imposed on Mr.
Himmel.

III.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

Himmel was a dramatic surprise to the bar 68 The supreme court,
h'!ving made its rule, has given itself a lot to sort out. If lawyers are to be
suspended for the practice of law, the court should offer clearer guidelines describing, for example: (I) to what extent does the reporting rule
apply to a lawyer who is asked to represent another lawyer accused of
offenses like fraud or conversion, (2) how soon after the lawyer first
learns of another lawyer's misconduct must the lawyer file the mandated
report, (3) to what extent does the lawyer's duty of zealous representation of the client affect the lawyer's duty to report, especially in cases
where the reporting might hurt the client's cause of action, and (4) how
much knowledge must the lawyer acquire before the mandatory duty to
report is created. These are serious and important issues, and the Illinois
Supreme Court should discuss them in detail. Preferably, the court will
proceed by carefully drafted rules; attorneys who have their livelihood on
the line deserve fair warning rather than after the fact rule making by
case law.
66. Since January 1, 1987, an Illinois state judge also has a reporting obligation under ILL
SUP. CT. R. 63, Canon 3B(3).
. .
67. The jury could render a verdict against the plaintiff on grounds, such as statute of limita~
tions, that do not dispute that the lawyer engaged in conversion.
68. Eg., Middleton, supra note 36.
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In the meantime, whatever criticisms the decision might draw, one
important fact is that the court's definition of "privileged communication" is narrow and clear. After Himmel, we should see a lot more reporting of lawyers. In fact, the preliminary empirical evidence already
suggests that the number of cases in which lawyers report other lawyers
has gone up. 69 This state of affairs should not be surprising for two reasons. First, most lawyers do obey the law. The good apples still outnumber the bad apples; so if the law says that lawyers must report (even if the
client instructs them not to report) and the information is not protected
by the evidentiary privilege, then lawyers will report. Second, many lawyers who do come across truly serious misconduct by other lawyers want
to report to the disciplinary authorities. They are normally reluctant, on
mere suspicion or slight infractions, to raise their fingers and accuse their
fellow lawyers, but when the action is serious enough and the evidence is
convincing, the empirical data indicates that lawyers desire to bring corrupt members of the bar to the attention of the disciplinary authorities 70
A rule requiring lawyers to report serves to reduce the internal debate
between one's desire to weed out the corrupt element from the bar and
the concern that one must not snitch, squeal, or tattle on a colleague. All
of these synonyms for "disclose" have pejorative connotations; consequently, a clear duty of mandatory reporting serves to help reduce this
constant pressure not to report, a pressure reflected in our use of
language. 71
However, neither we nor the Illinois Supreme Court should naively
think that the Himmel decision, by itself, will make any dramatic difference in lawyer discipline, because the number of lawyers who report is
not the only bottleneck. The procedures and practices under which the
Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission operates are an
equally important bottleneck. If Himmel had reported Casey, either
before or after Himmel had filed suit against Casey for conversion, there
is no assurance that the ARDC would have proceeded against Casey
with any greater dispatch. The main problem is the practice of
abatement.
Assume for the moment that Himmel had reported to the ARDC
the complaints of his client, Ms. Forsberg. Assume, further, that Himmel had reported Casey before Himmel filed the civil conversion suit
against Casey on behalf of Ms. Forsberg. I know of cases where lawyers
have done that, and the response they receive is not too encouraging.
The lawyer who is the subject of the report (or the lawyer whom that
lawyer has retained) may immediately retaliate by claiming that the first
69. Gross, Legal Ethics/or the Future: Time to Clean Up Our Act?, 77 ILL B.J. 196, 198 n.26
(1988); Middleton, supra note 36, at 3, coL 3.
70. See Note, 171e La11yer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 509,
515-16 (1978).
71. See generally R. ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE passim (1986).
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lawyer (the reporting lawyer) is "abusing" the ARDC procedures to apply "improper pressure" on the allegedly wayward attorney.
The notion that the ARDC would apply improper pressure on the
wayward attorney is somewhat less than compelling. Nonetheless, it
often does seem to muddy the waters when the lawyer who is the subject
of the report retaliates against the reporting lawyer and claims that the
reporting lawyer seeks to profit from ARDC action. With the two lawyers raising charges against each other, we should not be surprised that
the disciplinary authorities wait until after the original underlying lawsuit is filed; once suit is filed, the disciplinary authorities then wait until
the results of that suit are final.
Let us assume, alternatively, that Mr. Himmel reported Casey after
Himmel had filed a lawsuit against Casey for conversion of Ms. Forsberg's assets. What would the ARDC have done? Recall the Himmel
court noted that "(p ]erhaps some members of the public would have been
spared from Casey's misconduct had respondent reported the information as soon as he knew of Casey's conversion of client funds.'m However, it is quite reasonable to assume that nothing different would have
happened. If Mr. Himmel had candidly reported Casey to the ARDC,
and disclosed that his client was about to sue Mr. Casey or had sued
Casey, nothing would have prevented the ARDC from abating the disciplinary proceeding. Illinois, like most states, typically abates disciplinary
actions when the complainant files a civil action against the attorney. 73
The practice of abating disciplinary actions, though common, is perverse. If the lawyer has engaged in conduct that violates the disciplinary
rules but does not cause client harm-for example, the lawyer commingles client trust funds but returns the funds with interest so there is no
harm caused to the client-then the disciplinary authorities may
promptly proceed with the discipline. 74 But if, as in Ms. Forsberg's case,
the attorney violation is so bad that the client has a legal claim for damages and the damages are so great that it is worth the expense of litigation for the client to find another attorney to proceed with a lawsuit, then
the disciplinary action abates and the lawyer subject to discipline can
properly announce that he is an active member of the bar "with no disciplinary record. " 75 One would think that the preferable alternative is for
the bar authorities to proceed or, at the very least, to suspend the pro72. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 545, 533 N.E.2d at 796. The ARDC administrator specifically
presented this argument to the court. See id. at 544, 533 N.E.2d at 795 ("[T]he Administrator notes
that Casey converted many clients' funds after respondent's duty to report Casey arose.").
73. See, e.g., Weber, "Still in Good Standing:" The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1987, at 58-59; Rotunda, The Litigator's Responsibility, TRIAL, Mar. 1989, at 98, 100; see also
telephone conversation with ARDC spokesperson (Mar. 31, 1989).
74. For an instance in another state where that is exactly what happened, see What Went
Wrong?-Conversations with Disciplined Lawyers: A Documentary, by Professor Larry Durbin, U,
of Detroit School of Law (1985) (videotape interviews with several lawyers, one of whom was in this
situation).
75. Weber, supra note 73, at 58.
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ceedings rather than abate them 76 But that is not what happens. In
Himmel it is interesting to note that when the ARDC eventually disbarred Casey on consent it did so based on "matters unrelated to Forsberg's claim. " 77
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Sullivan 78 illustrates the inaction or delayed action relating to the procedures and practices of the
ARDC. The Seventh Circuit filed its opinion on April 28, 1988. In the
course of this opinion it stated the following:
Finally, we were astonished to learn at argument that disciplinary
proceedings had never been initiated against [Attorney] Sullivan and
that he remains to this day a lawyer in good standing in the Illinois
bar, continuing to practice real estate law. Yet the trial of this case
revealed acknowledged and very serious fraud on his part, for which
he might well have been prosecuted criminally although he was not.
(The other three conspirators pleaded guilty to federal criminal
charges.) And this has been known for many years. We are mailing
this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission for such disciplinary action against Sullivan as the
Commission may deem appropriate. 79
Whether the ARDC knew of Mr. Sullivan's criminal fraud before
April 28, 1988, it certainly knew of it after that date. On that date three
Seventh Circuit judges, comprising a unanimous panel, asked the ARDC
to take action against a lawyer whom they concluded was involved in a
criminal conspiracy. Mr. Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit ruled, engaged in
"acknowledged and very serious fraud" and "this has been known for
many years." 80 What has the ARDC done since then? The ARDC has
the power to act swiftly, and it has the power to seek an interim suspension if the Inquiry Board of the ARDC votes a complaint charging Mr.
Sullivan with a code violation involving fraud with "persuasive evidence"
to support the charge 81
On January 18, 1989, in response to a letter from the ARDC administrator, I asked what, if anything, the ARDC has done with regard to
the Sullivan case. As of this date (July 7, 1989), I have received no re76. Jt is interesting to note that the government of Great Britain, in a green paper on the
British legal system, voiced similar complaints. "The possibility of court proceedings should not be
used as an excuse to prevent or delay making right what has gone wrong, especially when the damage is perfectly clear." LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, THE WORK AND ORGANISATION OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CMND. No. 750, at !8.

77.
78.

Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
846 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1988).

79. !d. at 385.
80. !d.
81. See, e.g., Mulroy & Palmer, The Illinois Allorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission: Its Structure, Operation, and Limitations, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1186-87 (1987); see also
id. at 1193-94 ("The ARDC rules reflect an awareness thai disciplinary cases should be handled
expeditiously. An attorney's fitness to practice law should not be adjudicated three to six years after
the misconduct is discovered, allowing that attorney to engage in further improper behavior in the
meantime.") (footnotes omitted).
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sponse. Yet surely an attorney's "acknowledged and very serious fraud"
by an attorney continuing to practice law suggests that some sort of public discipline may be in order and that the ARDC should act with some
dispatch. The United States Supreme Court has commented that the
"glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the federal courts
and, ultimately, disrespect for the law." 82 This litigation glacier may easily outrun the pace of ARDC proceedings. And, one should add, concerns like those raised by the Sullivan case are no anomaly. 83
Another problem with ARDC procedures as they work in practice
is that the outside lawyers who serve as fact finders (i.e.-jurors) for the
ARDC do not always appear to follow the ARDC's own rules. As one
member of the ARDC Inquiry Board has noted:
Although the [ARDC] panel's function is to determine probable
cause rather than the merits of the case, the panels frequently will
not vote a complaint unless a majority is persuaded that the respondent has violated the disciplinary code .... Thus, in some cases, a
panel might close a matter with a self-contradictory letter to the respondent saying, in effect, "We find no probable cause to vote a
complaint, but don't do it again." 84
The failure of the Inquiry Board to follow its own rules is always an
unfortunate practice. It is particularly so in these circumstances, for it
allows an accused attorney, relying on this "self-contradictory letter" to
represent to the outside world (and to the victim who had complained to
the ARDC) that the ARDC found no probable cause, so that the accused
attorney appears to have done nothing wrong. What is supposed to be a
82.
83.

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980).
A recent article in the Chicago Tribune quoted an ARDC member's comments on the
Himmel case: "If he [Himmel] was a partner at a big firm, like Jenner & Block, nothing would have
happened." Warren, Possley & Tybor, Supremely Ethical, or An Easy Mark, Chicago Trib., Nov. l,
1988, § 3, at 3, coL L This remark may illustrate the attitude of some people who make up the
"Board of Directors" of the ARDC.
The popular press shares this distrust of, and unhappiness with, the ARDC. For example, a
recent editorial complained of the Doss case:
Doss finally surrendered his law license . . but those close to the case say the state Supreme
Court Registration and Discipline Commission, the agency charged with weeding unfit lawyers
from practice, never conducted a real investigation of the case. Despite serious complaints
about Doss' conduct that date back nearly a decade, he never was ordered to cease the practice
of law.
Foreman, Justice In Doss Case Isn't Blind, Just Lame, Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, Oct 25,
1988, at A4 (editorial). Doss stole $2.5 million from his client, Mr. Eugene Bloomingdale, and then
lied to conceal it. .He was convicted of perjury and, in 1989, sentenced to 30 months probation.
Dey, Doss' Poor Health Yields Sentence of Confinement, Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, Jan. 18,
1989, at AI, cols. 5-6. Doss cheated Mr. Bloomingdale out of his money in 1973. Mr. Bloomingdale's widow now lives with her mother because she has extensive bills and she does not ''have
anyplace else to live." !d. at p. A!O, col. 6.
After all of these years, "Doss has served not one day in jail, done not one hour of public
service, paid not one penny in llnes and paid exactly none of the $2.5 million he owes Eugene Bloomingdale." Foreman, supra, at A4.
84. Mulroy & Palmer, The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission: Its
Structure, Operation, and Limitations, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1192 (1987) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added). One of the authors of this article is a member of the ARDC Inquiry Board.
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discipline proceeding instituted to protect the public becomes a whitewash, a vindication of the accused, a decision by the ARDC that the
charges against the accused did not even rise to the level of probable
cause. The ARDC, an institution designed to protect the public, is used
by the lawyer to protect his or her misconduct.
Trial lawyers often say that they do not want members of the bar to
be on juries. The concern is that jurors who are also lawyers are more
likely to ignore the judge's instructions and take the law into their own
hands. Perhaps some of the lawyers on the ARDC panels are only doing
what comes naturally when they send this "self-contradictory letter." If
so, the Illinois Supreme Court should consider revamping the entire system and treat disciplinary complaints like civil cases, where the ARDC
presents its case to a real judge and a jury of lay people. 85 Then, public
scrutiny of such proceedings, open to the public and not held behind
closed doors, 86 will serve as an independent check of the fairness of attorney discipline procedures. Such a proposal is hardly radical; several
states already have opened discipline procedures to the public and, contrary to the expectations of the opponents of such reform, the sky has not
fallen 87
85. The ABA has recommended that one-third of the statewide agencies on discipline should
be nonlawyer, public members, with a lawyer as chairperson. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DrsCll'LJNE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 3.4 (Feb. 1979). Bu,;E RIBBON COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE FUNCTIONS AND 0PERATl0NS OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, fiNAL REPORT (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], recommended that non]awyers
be placed on the Inquiry Board. !d. at 6, 18-22. The National Organization of Bar Counsel bas also
recommended that nonlawyers be involved in the disciplinary process at all levels. Woytash, It's
Time To Do Something About Lawyer Competence, 64 A.B.A. J. 308 (1978).
However, to have some lay members and yet to have the fact finding controlled by lawyer
members is tinkering with the system rather than reforming it.
ln Great Britain as well, the government has determined that there should be stronger and more
effective lay control over the machinery of discipline of attorneys. In its green paper, the government proposes to authorize the lord chancellor to appoint a "Legal Services Ombudsman" with
broad powers, much broader than the "office of Lay Observer," which the ombudsman will replace.
The new ombudsman will have power: to examine the way lawyers have handled complaints
brought against them; to reinvestigate cases; to refer cases back to the disciplinary tribunal; to recommend that the relevant professional legal body pay compensation; to recommend improvements
to the discipline procedure; and to "publicise his decisions." LORD CHANCELLOR's DEPARTMENT,
THE WORK AND 0RGANISAT10N OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CMND. NO. 570, at 18. The
FINAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 5, also noted: "There is mistrust of the Illinois disciplinary system
because it is conducted in secret."
86. The American Bar Associa1ion recommends that prior to the filing and service of formal
discipline charges, the proceedings should be confidential (unless the respondent has waived confidentiality, the proceeding is based on the conviction of a crime, or the proceeding is based on allegations that have become generally known to the public). ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DlSCIPLJNE AND DJSABILJTY PROCEEDlNGS § 8.25 (1979). Then, the proceedings should be open to
the public, "[U]pon the filing and service of formal charges the proceedings should be public, except
for: (a) deliberations of the hearing committee, board or court; and (b) information with respect to
which the hearing committee has issued a protective order." !d.
87. See Moya, The Doors Stay Shut on Discipline, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 4, & 12,
col. 1. Proponents of open procedures note that there is "no reason for protecting lawyers' privacy
in disciplinary proceedings when no similar protective measures exist for laymen charged with
crime." !d. at 12, col. 4. It is much more serious to be charged with a crime than with a discipline
violation, and the person charged with a crime is subject to discipline procedures even though we
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know he or she may ultimately be acquitted. The FINAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 44, recommends
that the discipline proceedings should be public "upon the filing and service of formal charges"
except for "(a) deliberations of the Hearing Panel, Review Board or Court; and (b) information with
respect to which the Hearing Panel has issued a protective order (including information protected by
the attorney-client privilege.")

